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UTILITARIANISM REFORMED
L. W. Sumner*
UTILITARIANISM AND CO-OPERATION. By .Donald H. Regan.
New York: Oxford University Press. 1980. Pp. xiv, 279. Cloth
$37.50; paper $15.95.

In 1780, the first edition was printed of Jeremy Bentham's Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, the earliest modem statement of the moral theory that has come to be known as
utilitarianism. 1 Despite the vicissitudes of philosophical fashion
since Bentham's time, the theory has seldom relinquished its position
as the centerpiece of Anglo-American moral, political, and legal philosophy. The issues that have animated the enormous literature on
utilitarianism may be broadly grouped into two categories: the external and the internal. The former concerns the relations between
utilitarianism and rival theories, or between utilitarianism and
"common sense." The critical question here is the adequacy of the
theory as a general guide to individual moral decision, social choice,
and the construction of political and legal institutions. This external
debate has been paralleled by an equally vigorous intratheoretical
inquiry carried on within the utilitarian camp itself. The critical issue here is the comparative assessment of the various versions of the
theory. Utilitarianism, like most political and religious ideologies,
appears to be a single unified doctrine only from afar. It is, in fact, a
family of theories loosely linked by a shared set of basic presuppositions. The internal debate concerning the relative merits of the
many possible members of this family has not been entirely insulated from the external one, for some versions of the theory have
been devised and defended for their supposed ability to surmount
what have been felt to be formidable substantive difficulties. But
much of the discussion has assumed the adequacy of a generally util• Professor of Philosophy, University of Toronto. B.A. 1962, University of Toronto; M.A.
1964, Ph.D. 1965, Princeton University. The author has recently published a book on Abortion
and Moral Theory (1981). - Ed.
I. Actual publication was delayed until 1789 owing, Bentham tells us, to his discovery of
some unexpected metaphysical difficulties. His attempt to resolve them led to the composition
of Of Laws in General. See J. BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1970) (the
manuscript was first published in 1945 under the title The Limits of Jurisprudence JJtjined).
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itarian approach and has been directed toward identifying the variant that best meets the theory's own standards.
The internal issues then subdivide into two categories. The .first
concerns the content of the theory: What determines the value of an
action's consequences? The second concerns the theory's form:
What is the connection between the moral properties of an action
and the value of its consequences? Even a limited number of plausible options concerning each of these elements will combine to generate a sizable variety of theories, each of which may reasonably be
represented as utilitarian.
Donald H. Regan's Utilitarianism and Co-operation, published
exactly two hundred years after the printing of Bentham's pioneering
work, provides fresh evidence that the theory's resources have not
yet been exhausted. The book falls nicely into the second subdivision of the internal debate. Regan does not try to defend utilitarianism against rival approaches; nor does he tell us what to count as
utility. He attempts instead to assess the relative merits, from a utilitarian point of view, of some of the theory's traditional forms: actutilitarianism, rule-utilitarianism, and utilitarian generalization.
Regan's arguments and conclusions are important, and I will return to them shortly. First, however, I have some cautions for potential readers. Despite Regan's academic post at the University of
Michigan Law School, the book contains no legal theory whatsoever.
Regan con.fines himself to utilitarianism as a moral theory and ignores its political and legal implications. The discussion is, moreover, highly theoretical. Regan is concerned with practical moral
problems only to the extent necessary to expose the strengths and
weaknes~es of possible versions of the theory. Most of the cases that
he uses to test the theory's traditional varieties are themselves highly
formal. Although he pays some attention to real-life examples illustrating the various theories, he never carries the analysis past the
point where the desired theoretical conclusions have emerged. This
avoidance of both political-legal and practical-moral issues means
that the book will interest only moral philosophers.
Beyond this initial narrowing of the potential audience lie some
further barriers. The questions that Regan addresses are extremely
intricate, and an adequate treatment of them cannot fail to be itself
intricate. Even the professional philosopher will .find the book dense
and difficult. This is not necessarily a defect. Indeed, Regan has
done his best to mitigate the reader's inevitable labors in persevering
through the argument. The main track of his argument is not hard
to follow if one passes by the side trails that are now and again ex-
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plored. The book begins with a map of the route and signposts are
located at frequent intervals. Complications and digressions are
clearly labeled and often segregated from the central argument. Finally, not the least of the book's virtues is that the author has confined technical vocabulary to the minimum necessary for efficient
deployment of the argument, and he writes in plain and accessible
English. In short, as many concessions have been made to the reader
as are compatible with analytic rigor. But the issues remain complex, and their exploration forbidding.
Moreover, many moral philosophers, who are, after all, trained
to read hard books in their subject, will find the issues unfamiliar. In
the past two decades, the literature on the varieties of utilitarianism
has undergone a dramatic population explosion. The debate that
Regan has joined has an extensive history, and an understanding of·
his contribution is aided considerably by familiarity with that history. Even though Regan has done much to explain the issues to the
uninitiated, a reader's lack of background will be an added liability
that he will need to surmount.
Before the book's potential audience shrinks to the vanishing
point, let me provide some incentives for tackling this book. The
literature on this subject, as on most, consists of a very large number
of minor pieces and a very small number of landmark works. The
two principal landmarks to date have been David Lyons's Forms
and Limits of Utilitarianism 2 and D.H. Hodgson's Consequences of
Utilitarianism. 3 Now there is a third. (It is an interesting sidelight
that all three books began life as doctoral dissertations; apparently
this is the sort of work of which one is capable only during one's
graduate studies.) Regan's book has raised the state of the art to a
new level. It is rigorous, lucid, comprehensive, and original. It illuminates virtually every issue it addresses, including those that it
shares with Lyons and Hodgson. A later landmark, of course, profits
from the opportunity to criticize its predecessors, but even adjusting
for this historical advantage, Regan's work is an impressive accomplishment. No one interested in the structure of utilitarian theories
can afford to ignore it.
* * *
In the remainder of this Review I will first briefly outline Regan's
main argument and then join some of the issues that it raises.4 His
2. D. LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM (196S).
3. D.H. HODGSON, CONSEQUENCES OF UTILlTARIANISM (1967).
4. In my formulation of the argument, I have made minor alterations in some of Regan's
definitions and theories, in the interest both of greater uniformity among them and of economy
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objective is to compare the merits of three forms of utilitarianism.
The most familiar of these is act-utilitarianism:
AU
An act is right if and only if it produces the
best possible consequences in the situation in
which it is performed. 5
Of the various possible versions of rule-utilitarianism and utilitarian
generalization, Regan selects (for reasons that will shortly become
clear) what he calls the "co-ordinated optimization principle":
COP
An act is right if and only if it is prescribed
(for the agent whose act is in question) by
that universal prescription for action, the universal satisfaction of which would produce
the best possible consequences.
The third member of the trio is what Regan calls "co-operative
utilitarianism":
CU
Each agent ought to co-operate, with whoever
else is co-operating, in the production of the
best possible consequences, given the behavior of nonce-operators.
The first step of the argument is a definition of what it is for a moral
theory to be satisfied:
Theory T is satisfied when an agent actually
does what T requires him to do in a given situation.
It is then possible to define two properties that a particular moral
theory might possess:
Theory T has PropAU if any agent satisfying
T in any situation produces by his act the best
possible consequences.
Theory T has PropCOP if all agents satisfying
T in all situations jointly produce by their
acts the best possible consequences.
Regan suggests that the fundamental intuitive idea underlying actutilitarianism is that a moral theory ought to be a good theory for
each individual to follow (!.e., it ought to have PropAU), and that the
fundamental intuitive idea underlying the traditional forms of ruleutilitarianism and utilitarian generalization is that a moral theory
of vocabulary. Any resulting distortions of his meaning are, of course, entirely my
responsibility.
5. In AU, and in all subsequent contexts, "best possible consequences" must be read to
mean "consequences at least as good as would be produced by any alternative." See Regan's
formulation of AU, p. 12.
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ought to be a good theory for all individuals to follow (!.e., it ought to
have PropCOP). Ideally, then, a utilitarian should want a moral theory to have both properties. We thus have two standards, internal to
utilitarianism, for judging versions of the theory.
Regan's main substantive contentions may now be readily
enumerated:
(1) AU has PropAU but not PropCOP.
(2) COP has PropCOP but not PropAU.
(3) No form of rule-utilitarianism or utilitarian generalization has PropAU (and most do not even have
PropCOP).
(4) No form of utilitarianism that resembles AU and
COP in being "exclusively act-oriented" can have
both PropAU and PropCOP.
(5) CU, which is not exclusively act-oriented, has both
PropAU and PropCOP.
(6) Therefore, on internal utilitarian grounds, CU is preferable to AU and also to any form of rule-utilitarianism or utilitarian generalization.
For these claims to be fully intelligible we need a definition of "exclusively act-oriented." I will return to this later. Although the main line of Regan's argument can be quickly
sketched, a detailed description is a much more complicated matter.
I cannot hope to do justice to more than a small part of it. I shall
therefore pass over Regan's critique of rule-utilitarianism and utilitarian generalization, and focus on the relative merits of AU and

cu.

That AU has PropAU is obvious. That it does not have
PropCOP is shown by the following case. Imagine two persons, Row
and Column, each of whom is presented with two possible options:
for Row these are rl and r2 and for Column they are cl and c2.
They must choose between these options independently; neither is
able to communicate with, or in any way to influence the decision
process of, the other. Their actual choices will jointly produce an
outcome, the values of the possible outcomes being given in the following matrix:
Column
cl
c2
Case 1

r1

10

0

r2

0

6

Row
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Let us say that an outcome is optimal when it is best (ie., at least as
good as any other outcome). In this situation, rlcl is the optimal
outcome. If Row and Column by their choices jointly produce that
outcome, then each satisfies AU: given Row's rl, AU requires Column's cl, and vice versa. But if Row and Column jointly produce
r2c2 then each still satisfies AU: given Row's r2, AU requires Column's c2, and vice versa. AU is thus universally satisfied either by
rlcl (the optimal outcome) or by r2c2 (a suboptimal outcome); AU
is indeterminate between these outcomes. Because universal satisfaction of AU does not ensure joint production of the best consequences, AU does not have PropCOP.
In Case 1, no stipulation was made of either Row's or Column's
reasons for choice, but we are free to imagine that they are both actutilitarians. Let us say that an outcome is an equilibrium when each
agent's choice produces the best possible consequences, given the actual choice of the other; let us also say that the agents have coordi-,
nated when they have jointly produced an equilibrium outcome.
Act-utilitarian agents will wish to coordinate, since they will each
have failed to satisfy AU if they jointly produce a nonequilibrium
outcome. But universal satisfaction of AU requires only that they
coordinate, not that they coordinate to produce the optimal outcome.
Case 1 establishes that AU lacks PropCOP. Since this is the defect in AU that leads Regan to prefer CU, it is important to ascertain
just how serious the defect is. Regan has not shown that AU is selfdefeating. (A moral theory is self-defeating when its satisfaction impairs the achievement of its own aims.) 6 AU is not self-defeating for
two reasons. First, it does not fail according to its own standards.
PropAU captures the fundamental intuitive idea behind AU, and
AU has PropAU. AU fails only by the standards of rule-utilitarianism and utilitarian generalization. These may, of course, be standards worth meeting, and they are utilitarian standards, but they are
not act-utilitarian standards. Second, and more important, while it
is true that universal satisfaction of AU may produce a suboptimal
outcome, it is not true that it must produce such an outcome. 7 The
6. For a useful discussion of self-defeatingness in moral theories, see Parfit, Is CommonSense Morality Se!f-IJefeating?, 76 J. PHIL. 533 (1979).
7. See pp. 54-65. Here lies the crucial difference between AU and some other consequentialist principles. AU directs an agent to produce by his act the best overall consequences for
everyone; it thus assigns each agent a common goal. What we might call act-egoism (AE)
directs an agent to produce by his act the bestpersonal consequences for himself; it thus assigns
each agent a different goal. AU may face coordination problems in which universal satisfaction of the theory is compatible with a suboptimal outcome. But AE, besides facing analogous
problems (in situations of perfect identity of interest), may also face Prisoners' Dilemmas (in
situations of partial conflict of interest) in which universal satisfaction of the theory ensures a
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optimal outcome in act-utilitarian coordination problems, after all, is
also always an equilibrium. Production by each agent individually
of best consequences is therefore a necessary, though not a sufficient,
condition of production by all agents collectively of best
consequences.
Even if AU is not self-defeating, however, the fact that a set of
act-utilitarians may each satisfy their theory while coordinating on a
suboptimal outcome still seems bothersome. The degree of bother
varies in direct proportion to the size of the gap between the optimal
and suboptimal outcomes. Consider the following matrix, for all
values of n > 1:
Column

Case 2

cl

c2

rl

n

0

r2

0

1/n

Row

Or again:
Column

Case 3

cl

c2

r1

Ion

0

r2

0

10-n

Row

The second, and especially the third case show that as the value of n
increases it becomes correspondingly more important that act-utilitarians coordinate to produce the optimal outcome.
Regan's argument does not show that they always, or indeed
ever, fail to coordinate. This is its most important limitation. For all
that the argument tells us, sets of act-utilitarian agents might invariably succeed, as a matter of fact, in coordinating to produce the optimal outcome. The indeterminacy of AU in Cases 1-3 may easily
mislead us: AU's indeterminacy only means that it is universally satisfied by both the optimal and the suboptimal outcome; it does not
mean that AU requires agents to be indifferent between the two outcomes. If Row and Column in Cases 1-3 choose rlcl, they jointly
produce better consequences than if they had chosen r2c2, but each
also individually produces better consequences than if they had cho~
suboptimal outcome. There is no counterpart for AU of conflict-of-interest choice situations.
See Parfit, supra note 6.
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sen r2c2. 8 Since AU enjoins them to produce the best consequences,
each, therefore, has an AU-given reason for preferring that they coordinate to produce the optimum. Neither, of course, can bring
about this result unilaterally, but each has a reason for doing what
he can to help bring it about. This fact explains why we should find
it inexplicable, indeed perverse, if the two act-utilitarians in Cases 13 were to coordinate on the suboptimal outcome.9 If coordinating to
produce the optimal outcome were just as easy as producing the
suboptimal outcome, what reason could either have for unilaterally
defeating that result?
In coordination problems, one equilibrium result may possess
some property that makes it stand out from the others; it may, that is,
be salient. 10 It then becomes an obvious point on which agents who
wish to coordinate may converge. In the first three Cases, rlcl stands
out simply because it is optimal. This fact provides act-utilitarians
with an AU-given reason for trying to coordinate to produce that
outcome. They have available to them a strategy which, if universally followed, will ensure such coordination. Consider Case 1
again. Row's r1 will yield (depending on Column's choice) either 10
or 0; call this his 10-0 option. His r2 will yield either 0 or 6; call this
his 0-6 option. Column also faces 10-0 and 0-6 options. Row and
Column are thus symmetrically situated. 11 Neither option is (even
weakly) dominant; however, they do have different maxima. If Row
and Column both choose the option with the higher maximum (if
both "maximax") they will coordinate to produce the optimum. And
they will do so in all act-utilitarian coordination problems where
there is a unique optimal result. Nothing, incidentally, depends on
the fact that Row and Column are symmetrically situated in the first
three Cases. This symmetry is absent in the following case:
Column

Case4

cl

c2

r1

10

5

r2

0

6

Row

8. I use here the marginal conception of consequences (correctly) favored by Regan, pp.
13-17.
9. It is also what lies behind the obviousness argument that Regan dismisses. See pp. 2123.
IO. I have borrowed this term from Gauthier, Coordination, 14 DIALOGUE 195 (1975). The
classic discussion is T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960).
11. By saying that Row and Column are symmetrically situated I mean that the possible
(individual) consequences of their options are identical. Regan uses a different notion of symmetry. See pp. 23-25.
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Here Row faces 10-5 and 0-6 options while Column faces 10-0 and
5-6 options. Nonetheless, if both maximax they will coordinate to
produce the optimal result, rlcl.
Maximax is, therefore, a rule or procedure for choosing among
options that will naturally suggest itself for universal adoption by
act-utilitarians in coordination problems. What is its status relative
to AU itself? We should remember that satisfying AU generally requires considerable information about the choice situation. AU is
difficult to satisfy when that information is, for whatever reason, incomplete. Consider cases of "individual choice under uncertainty."
Here, the outcome is determined partly by the individual's choice
and partly, not by the independent choice of another agent, but by
nature. Further, the agent lacks sufficient information even to assign
objective probabilities to the various possible states of nature. Imagine that Row is told that an um contains 100 balls, some red and
some black, but is not told the ratio of one to the other. One ball is
to be drawn at random from the um and Row is required to choose
between betting on red or black, with the following payoffs:
Red
Case 5

Nature
Black

Red

IO

0

Black

0

6

Row

Asssuming that Row wishes to produce the best consequences, how
is he to choose? Given that he is confronted by 10-0 and 0-6 options,
it seems reasonable for him to maximax, and thus to bet red. Maximax is a strategy or procedure intended to increase the likelihood of
satisfying AU in a situation whose incomplete description makes it
impossible to satisfy AU directly. Whether the strategy is best in a
particular case will be determined by the way things actually tum
out (whether AU is satisfied). Whether it is best in all cases of this
sort will be determined by the way things actually tum out in the
long run (how often AU is satisfied). AU thus remains the final test
of the value of the strategy. In Case 5, maximax seems to be a sensible act-utilitarian strategy. This is, however, not always so in situations of "individual choice under uncertainty." Consider the
following case:
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Nature
Black

Red

10

0

Black

8

9

Row

Here maximax still dictates betting red, but betting black seems the
wiser choice. Agents in situations of "individual choice under uncertainty" who are attempting to satisfy AU will have to attend to both
the maxima and the minima of their options.
Whereas maximax is a fallible strategy for an individual act-utilitarian in choice under uncertainty, it is an infallible strategy for a
group of act-utilitarians in coordination problems with a unique optimum. This very fact renders it salient for the members of such a
group and thus incr~ases the likelihood that they will all follow it
and so will all coordinate to produce the optimal result.
An outcome may be salient for reasons other than its being an
optimum. The bare schemata of coordination problems largely suppress the further properties that can make outcomes salient. In reallife problems, however, some of these additional cues are likely to be
available to agents who are trying to coordinate. To the extent that
they are available in a given case, act-utilitarians again increase their
chances of successful coordination.
These further salient properties become particularly important
when we discard a feature that has been shared by all cases thus far
considered: their possession of a unique optimum.
Column

Case7

cl

c2

rl

10

0

r2

0

10

Row

With no further cues, Row and Column have no reason for preferring rlcl over r2c2; maximax does not determine a unique choice.
Row and Column are therefore in danger of failing to coordinate on
either equilibrium, and thus of failing to satisfy AU. Each has an
AU-given reason for trying to coordinate, but no reason for aiming
at a particular equilibrium outcome. If they are presented only with
the abstract schema and are still prevented from communicating,
they may have to resort to a randomized strategy that depends for its
success upon luck. In cases with multiple optima, AU remains indeterminate in outcome since it is universally satisfied by any equilib-
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rium, including a suboptimal one. But it is also indeterminate in
strategy: because there is no unique optimum, there is also no salient
choice procedure on which to converge. In real-life coordination
problems with multiple optima, act-utilitarians who are unable to
communicate will need to rely on further cues to render one of the
optima salient. 12
If, unlike Row and Column, they are able to communicate, they
will have additional resources for ensuring coordination. In the first
four Cases they should agree to maxim.ax, and in Case 7 they should
agree to choose one of the two equally attractive optima. Thus
again, once the artificial constraints of the abstract problem are discarded, the chances improve that act-utilitarians will in fact manage
to produce an optimal outcome. 13
In some real-life coordination problems, communication and
agreement are admittedly either impossible or excessively costly whether because of the number of agents involved, or their spatial or
temporal distance from one another, or whatever. In such cases, a
further device is available to produce coordination: the establishment and enforcement of a rule. Navigation is an obvious example.
Perhaps in each separate instance ships approaching one another
would manage to agree to pass either to port or to starboard, but it is
more efficient to select one or the other (perhaps arbitrarily), enforce
it as a general rule, and punish violators. Society exists, in part at
least, to solve coordination problems. Sanctions alter the consequences of the choices confronting the agents. In Case 7, for instance, enforcing a rule requiring Row's rl and Column's cl agents choosing other options would be punished - would reduce
the value of r2c2, thus converting Case 7 into something more like
Case 1. And, of course, the fact that a given action is legally (or
socially) required may itself render the action salient, even apart
from its effect on the value of its consequences.
12. Regan's cooperative utilitarians must also resort to such cues in choice situations of this
sort. See pp. 190-206.
13. Regan's discussion of communication and agreement among act-utilitarian agents, pp.
32-43, is the least convincing in the book. The issue is not how act-utilitarians develop practices such as language use or agreement keeping, but whether act-utilitarians who have such
practices can use them to coordinate. The very existence of the practices renders cenain procedures (such as agreeing to maximax and then keeping the agreement) salient; therefore, they
increase the likelihood of optimal coordination (which is what act-utilitarians will be trying to
achieve). Regan recognizes all this when he summarizes his objection: "[A]ll I claim is that it
does not follow from the fact that certain parties are act-utilitarians that an 'agreement' between them will have any effect on their expectations or behaviour. Whether an agreement is
effective or not depends on facts about the parties other than the fact that they are act-utilitarians." P. 37. These further facts include their ability to speak a common language and to make
and keep agreements, properties generally possessed by real-life act-utilitarians.
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Because AU does not have PropCOP, universal satisfaction of
AU does not ensure coordination on an optimum. But universal satisfaction of AU is always compatible with coordination on some optimum, and act-utilitarians have an AU-given reason for wishing so
to coordinate. Act-utilitarians, moreover, have a variety of procedures, strategies, and devices - salience, communication, agreement, enforcement - available for increasing the likelihood of
effective coordination. AU's lack of PropCOP may, therefore, be a
theoretical defect with few practical costs. It will not much matter in
practice that universal satisfaction of AU does not ensure an optimal
outcome if universal satisfaction of AU infact generally results in an
optimal outcome.
Still, the fact remains that universal satisfaction of Regan's CU
does ensure production of an optimum. Is not a theory whose correct application by all guarantees an optimum superior, in practical
terms, to one whose correct application by all might produce a
suboptimum? Not necessarily. We need to distinguish two sorts of
consequences that may flow from a theory's universal satisfaction.
The first are the consequences of the acts that the theory requires:
call these the theory's direct consequences. The second are other
consequences of the procedure that the theory employs to yield its
conclusions: call these its indirect consequences. Unless act-utilitarians manage invariably to coordinate to produce an optimum, universal satisfaction of CU has better direct consequences than
universal satisfaction of AU. But satisfaction of CU may not have
better indirect consequences.
AU is exclusively act-oriented. This means that it provides
agents with a criterion for choosing among the acts open to them, but
it does not require the use of any particular procedure in making
that choice. CU is not exclusively act-oriented. It dictates a decisionmaking procedure; the right act is simply the one selected by that
procedure. One of the indirect consequences of a theory is the expenditure of time and energy needed to apply it. No theory is
costless in application, but complex and difficult decision-making
procedures are more costly than simple and easy ones. The procedure required by CU is complex and difficult. AU is more flexible in
allowing agents to resort to a variety of procedures and devices in
response to the exigencies of actual situations. AU has direct costs
since its universal satisfaction does not ensure the production of an
optimum; CU has indirect costs since its procedure consumes time
and energy. The direct advantages of CU must, therefore, be balanced against the indirect advantages of AU. How this balance will
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tum out is an empirical question, which will depend upon the frequency with which groups of act-utilitarians achieve optimal coordination, the extent of the losses (the gap between optimum and
suboptimum) on the occasions when they fail, the costs of the devices
available to act-utilitarians, and the costs of the procedure required
by CU. It is far from clear that the balance will, all things considered, favor CU. CU, in other words, may have no utilitarian advantage over AU.
The traditional strength of AU has been its flexibility. While it
provides an objective measure for the moral value of actions, it allows agents who are attempting to satisfy it to use a wide variety of
decision-making procedures that could enable them to overcome a
number of common liabilities: their own fallibility, their tendency
toward partiality, and their limited knowledge of the circumstances
that will affect the consequences of their acts. AU provides a standard for evaluating all of these procedures: the best set of procedures, adapted to different circumstances, is the set that best satisfies
AU over the long run. CU provides one such procedure, among
others, for use in coordination problems. Where its direct benefits
outweigh its indirect costs act-utilitarians have a reason for employing it; where its costs outweigh its benefits, they have no such reason.
When both direct and indirect consequences are taken into account,
CU takes its place as another strategy available to act-utilitarians
who are attempting to apply their theory in an imperfect world.

* * *

A version of utilitarianism ought to be adequate by utilitarian
standards. Regan has made a significant contribution to the internal
evaluation of forms of utilitarianism by distinguishing clearly between their adequacy on the individual and collective levels, and by
exposing the theoretical deficiency of AU on the latter level. The
proper conclusions to be drawn concerning the relative merits of AU
and CU are, however, more indeterminate than Regan would wish.
If we confine ourselves to the direct consequences of theories, then
the utilitarian costs of AU's lack of PropCOP will depend on the
extent to which act-utilitarians manage in real-life situations to coordinate to produce an optimum. And when we expand attention, as
utilitarians must, to all of the consequences of theories, direct and
indirect, then it is far from obvious that CU is superior to AU on
either the individual or collective level.
I would not wish to leave the impression that the criticisms I have
made of Regan's central argument are novel. Indeed, most of them
are anticipated and dealt with in the text, though I believe that they
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have greater force than Regan has been prepared to concede. Be
that as it may, the true measure of the value of this book will lie in
the quality of the controversy that it seems likely to inspire.

